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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The appellant, Anthony J. Dunleavy, was a consultant to 
appellee, Delaware County. In this capacity, Dunleavy 
advised the County as to the various federal regulatory 
requirements concerning certain Housing and Urban 
Development funding grants. Dunleavy sued the County 
contending that it committed several violations of the False 
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. S 3729, et seq. The District Court 
dismissed Dunleavy's Second Amended Complaint, holding 
that the County was not amenable to suit under the FCA 
due to its mandatory punitive damages scheme. We agree. 
Therefore, we will affirm the Order of the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
This appeal requires us to determine whether a local 
governmental subdivision can be subject to suit under the 
False Claims Act when the Act mandates treble damages. 
We must first determine whether the treble damages 
mandated by the Act are punitive. If so, we must then 
decide whether Congress clearly manifested its intention 
under the FCA to abrogate local governmental common law 
immunity from punitive damage awards. If it did not, we 
must further determine whether a local governmental 
subdivision may nevertheless be amenable to suit under 
the Act albeit subject to some lesser quantum of damages. 
Finally, we note in passing that we agree with the District 
Court that an employee of a local governmental unit is not 
subject to suit under the Act when the employee does not 
personally benefit from the transaction constituting a 
violation of the Act; therefore, we conclude that no extended 
discussion is necessary with respect to this issue. 
 
II. 
 
In 1976, Delaware County purchased the Penza tract in 
a condemnation action using HUD funds. The intended use 
of the Penza tract was to expand a pre-existing park. In 
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1979, however, the County entered into an agreement with 
the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (Penn DOT) 
whereby Penn DOT purchased 26.3 acres of the Penza 
tract. Penn DOT made additional purchases from the tract 
through the years until its final purchase from the County 
in 1988. Penn DOT intended to use the land for highway 
construction. After consulting with Dunleavy, the County 
decided that it would put the proceeds from the sales of 
Penza tract land into an interest-bearing account under the 
assumption that if Penn DOT was unable to use its newly 
acquired lands for highway construction the County would 
repurchase the land. On the other hand, if Penn DOT 
completed its highway construction, the County would 
return the proceeds from the land sales, plus interest to 
HUD. After numerous delays, Penn DOT completed its 
highway construction project in 1991. 
 
During the interim, the County occasionally used funds 
from the Penza tract account for general County purposes. 
Dunleavy contends that this was improper, because, in his 
view, the funds in the account were HUD program funds 
subject to various reporting requirements with which the 
County failed to comply. Further, Dunleavy contends that 
once the County knew that it would not be repurchasing 
the tract, the County knowingly failed to return the 
principal and interest earned on the account to HUD. 
Dunleavy's final contention is that the County fraudulently 
received additional monies from HUD in fiscal years`92, 
`93, `94, and `95 because the County took these monies 
knowing that it committed the previously alleged violations 
of HUD regulations with respect to Penza Tract funds. 
 
Dunleavy filed this action in 1994 seeking treble damages 
as required by the False Claims Act. In 1995, the 
Government declined to intervene, concluding that no fraud 
had been committed. HUD, however, after a Limited Review 
Audit, demanded that the County pay it 1.7 million dollars 
plus interest. In 1996, HUD and the County settled the 
dispute between them without including Dunleavy in the 
settlement process.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The False Claims Act permits the Government to settle with the 
Defendant notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the 
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The District Court dismissed Dunleavy's Second 
Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
a Judgment that we reversed and remanded to the District 
Court. The County then filed motions to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim and failure to plead with particularity, 
which were denied by the District Court. On May 23, 2000, 
the District Court, on its own motion, directed the parties 
to brief the question of whether this action should proceed 
in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000). The District Court concluded 
that Dunleavy's claim could not proceed in light of Stevens. 
See United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 
2000 WL 1522854 (E.D.P.A. 2000). This timely appeal  
followed.2 
 
We begin our analysis with a brief discussion of the legal 
framework controlling the resolution of this appeal. 
 
III. 
 
Unless Congress clearly provides otherwise, a local 
governmental entity is immune from punitive damages 
awards. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 
247 (1981) (holding that a municipality was immune from 
punitive damages awards under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 because 
at common law a municipality was absolutely immune from 
punitive damages and in enacting section 1983 Congress 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed 
settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances. 
See 31 U.S.C. S 3730(c)(2)(B) (1994). Therefore, in this case, Dunleavy as 
relator is prosecuting a qui tam civil action in the name of the Federal 
Government after the Government has determined that, in its view, no 
fraud has been committed. Accordingly, we do not consider the question 
of whether the United States may maintain a suit against a local 
government under the FCA. 
 
2. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1331, and the 
appeal was taken in accordance with Rule 4(a), Fed. R. App. P. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The questions of law before us are 
subject to our plenary review. Bowen v. Monus , 172 F.3d 270, 273 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
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did not clearly manifest an intention to abrogate this 
common law immunity). Similarly, in Genty v. Resolution 
Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991), we held that 
municipalities were immune from civil punitive damage 
awards under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. SS 1961-1968. In reaching our 
holding in Genty, we cited Fact Concerts  and commented 
that in order to subject municipalities to punitive damage 
awards, a statute must expressly provide for such an award 
against a municipality. See Genty, 937 F.2d at 910. 
Furthermore, we noted that the rationale for exempting a 
municipal entity from punitive damages awards is firmly 
grounded in public policy because "assessing punitive 
damages against a public entity serves neither the 
retributive nor the deterrent purposes of . . . civil 
punishment and contravenes public policy by punishing 
the taxpayers and citizens who constitute the very persons 
who `are to benefit from the public example which the 
granting of such damages is supposed to make of the 
wrongdoer.' " Id. at 910 (citation omitted). Simply stated, we 
concluded that a local government is presumptively 
immune from the imposition of punitive damages unless 
the statutory scheme which creates liability clearly 
indicates that Congress intended to abrogate the well- 
settled notion of local governmental common law immunity 
from punitive damages. See also Doe v. County of Centre, 
242 F.3d 437, 456 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that overcoming 
common law immunity requires a clear expression of 
congressional intent). 
 
We now turn to the threshold question on this appeal: 
whether the damages imposed by the Act are punitive. If 
the damages are properly characterized as punitive, we 
must next determine whether Congress expressly intended 
to abrogate local governmental immunity under the FCA. 
For the reasons that follow, we believe that the mandatory 
treble damages imposed by the Act are punitive and that 
Congress did not expressly abrogate local governmental 
immunity under the FCA. 
 
A. 
 
When first enacted in 1863, the FCA provided for suits to 
be brought in the name of the Government by private 
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individuals in a qui tam (in the name of the King) action. 
The Act imposes liability on any person who knowingly 
presents a false claim to the Federal Government for 
payment. 31 U.S.C. S 3729(a) (1994). The current version of 
the Act imposes a civil penalty between five and ten 
thousand dollars per false claim plus three times the 
amount of damages which the Government sustains. 31 
U.S.C. S 3729(a) (1994). Recently, in Vermont Agency of 
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens , 529 U.S. 
765 (2000), the United States Supreme Court examined the 
issue of whether a State or State agency is a "person" for 
purposes of the Act. In reaching its conclusion that a State 
is not within the meaning of "person" as used in the Act 
and therefore not amenable to suit under the Act by a qui 
tam realtor, the Court held that the Act imposes treble 
damages that are "punitive in nature." Id.  at 784. Thus, the 
Court has answered the first prong of our inquiry: the 
FCA's treble damages provision is punitive. Accord United 
States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. , 244 F.3d 
486, 491 n.5 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The treble damages imposed 
by the False Claims Act are punitive damages.") (citing 
Stevens, 529 U.S. at 784). 
 
Nonetheless, Dunleavy contends that the Supreme 
Court's characterization of the Act's damages provision is 
obiter dictum. We do not agree. The Stevens majority stated 
that "[s]everal features of the current statutory scheme 
further support the conclusion that States are not subject 
to qui tam liability," and that one of those features is that 
"the current version of the FCA imposes damages that are 
essentially punitive in nature." Stevens, at 783, 784. 
Clearly, the Court relied on the Act's treble damages 
scheme in reaching its holding and thus its declaration that 
the damages scheme is punitive is not dictum. We therefore 
agree with the Garibaldi court and conclude that the treble 
damages mandated by the FCA are punitive. See also 
Genty, 937 F.2d at 914 (holding that the mandatory treble 
damages scheme of civil RICO statute is punitive in 
character). 
 
B. 
 
We turn to the second prong of our inquiry: Did Congress 
express a clear indication to abrogate local governmental 
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immunity under the FCA? We note here that the parties' 
arguments focus on whether the term "person" as used in 
the Act encompasses local governments. This argument is 
simply the other side of the coin with respect to the 
question before us, namely whether Congress clearly 
abrogated local governmental immunity under the FCA. If 
Congress clearly expressed its intention to encompass local 
governments within the ambit of FCA liability as a"person," 
then it must also have intended to abrogate the common 
law immunity of local governments against punitive 
damages under the FCA. In our view, consistent with our 
reasoning in Genty, the question is whether Congress 
intended to disturb local governmental immunity from 
punitive damages by subjecting local governments to FCA 
suits. See Genty, 937 F.2d at 914 (noting that the RICO 
statute expresses no specific intention that municipalities 
be liable for treble damages); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't 
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) (holding that 
Congress did not intend to override well-established 
common law immunities in passing civil rights act). 
 
Dunleavy's assertions that Congress intended to subject 
municipalities to the FCA's coverage are unpersuasive in 
light of the fact that the statute offers no clear indication 
that Congress intended to abrogate local governmental 
immunity from punitive damages. Indeed, the relevant 
portion of the Act does not even define the term"person." 
In Genty, we observed that the civil RICO Act defined the 
word "person" as "any individual or entity capable of 
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." Genty, 
937 F.2d at 907 (quoting 18 U.S.C. S 1961(3)). Clearly, this 
definition of the term "person" is a broad one. Yet we 
nevertheless found that despite this broad definition of the 
term "person", Congress did not clearly  abrogate local 
governmental immunity from punitive damages in the 
context of civil RICO. Moreover, we observed that had 
Congress intended to subject local governments to punitive 
damages under RICO, it could have easily so stated, as it 
has done in other statutes imposing civil liability on local 
governments. See Genty, 937 F.2d at 914 (citing 15 U.S.C. 
S 77b(2)) (noting that Congress specifically provided for 
subjecting local governments to civil damage awards under 
the securities laws). Other statutes specifically define the 
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term "person" to include local governments or 
municipalities, such as the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
S 1362(5); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 
U.S.C. S 6903(15); the Wild Bird Conservation Act of 1992, 
16 U.S.C. S 4903(4); and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 
U.S.C. S 2701(27). Our Genty analysis is equally applicable 
here. We find nothing on the face of the relevant portions 
of the FCA as originally enacted in 1863 or in its current 
form which evidences a clear indication on the part of 
Congress to subject local governments to punitive damages 
under the Act. The Act is utterly devoid of any specific 
intention to subject local governments to its strictures. This 
lack of clarity in the text of the Act is insufficient indicia of 
congressional intent to abrogate local governmental 
immunity from punitive damages under the FCA. 
 
Dunleavy and amicus Taxpayers Against Fraud (False 
Claims Act Legal Center) argue that the original drafters' 
intent is immaterial to a determination of Congress' intent 
to subject local governmental subdivisions to liability under 
the FCA. He contends the intent of the Congress that 
enacted the treble damages scheme should control whether 
or not Congress intended to subject local governments to 
the FCA. His argument is premised on the notion that if in 
1863, Congress intended to encompass local governments 
within the meaning of the term "person" under the FCA, the 
subsequent amendment in 1986 to provide treble damages 
under the FCA is evidence of Congress' intent to subject 
local governments to punitive damages. 
 
Even if we were persuaded that the intent of the 1986 
Congress amending the Act controlled the resolution of this 
matter, Dunleavy's argument must fail. The 1986 
amendments added nothing to the meaning of the term 
"person" that remotely approaches a clear  expression of 
Congress' intent to abrogate local governmental immunity. 
See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 783 n.12 (observing that the term 
"person" in the FCA has not been altered since the FCA's 
initial passage in 1863). Moreover, in Genty, we found that 
Congress' imposition of treble damages in the RICO statute 
evinced its intent to exclude local governments from the 
civil RICO statute's coverage. See Genty, 937 F.2d at 914 
(Courts will not interpret statutes to overturn well- 
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established common law principles unless Congress so 
authorizes"); County of Centre, 242 F.3d at 456 (3d Cir. 
2001) (noting that Newport instructs us to assume that 
Congress intended to retain common law immunity absent 
a clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary). 
As a result, we cannot say that the imposition of the 
current treble damages scheme in and of itself evidences 
Congress' clear intent to abrogate common law immunity 
and subject local governments to punitive damages awards. 
We conclude that Congress' imposition of treble damages is 
powerful evidence that Congress did not intend to subject 
local governments to punitive damages under the FCA. 
Accord Garibaldi, 244 F.3d at 493 (stating that the punitive 
damages regime of the FCA reflects Congress' intent to 
exclude local governments from liability under the FCA). 
 
Second, Dunleavy points to the legislative history of the 
1986 amendments to support his theory that Congress 
intended to subject local governments to suit under the 
FCA by qui tam relators. We reiterate that even if we 
believed that the intent of the 1986 Congress controlled our 
determination, a question we do not decide here, 
Dunleavy's argument cannot pass muster in light of the 
Stevens Court's express rejection of the pertinent 1986 
legislative history as erroneous and of questionable value. 
See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 783 n.12 (noting that the 
legislative history contained the Senate's erroneous 
understanding of the meaning of the term "person" as used 
in the Act). At best, after considering the text of the statute 
and its legislative history, we find only ambiguity as to 
whether Congress intended to disturb the well-settled 
doctrine of local governmental immunity from punitive 
damages under the FCA. Ambiguity, however, is not enough 
for Dunleavy to carry the day. There is simply nothing in 
the FCA's text remotely manifesting a clear expression of 
Congress' intent to abrogate local governmental immunity 
against punitive damages under the Act. As a result, we 
hold that Congress did not intend to disturb local 
governmental immunity from punitive damages under the 
FCA by clearly including local governments within the 
meaning of the term "person." It necessarily follows that the 
County is immune from claims under the FCA by a qui tam 
relator due to the mandatory nature of the treble damages 
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provision. See Genty, 937 F.2d at 911-12 (treble damages 
awards under RICO are mandatory and therefore 
municipalities may not be liable under RICO if those 
damages are punitive). 
 
C. 
 
Dunleavy and the United States, as amicus, invite us to 
subject the County to "some liability", however, by reading 
into the statute an exception to the mandatory treble 
damages scheme. In essence, Dunleavy and the United 
States argue that we should reduce any treble damages 
award against a local government to a level that would be 
deemed compensatory rather than punitive. We decline to 
create such an exception under the FCA, just as we 
declined in Genty with the RICO statute. Genty, 937 F.2d at 
914. The FCA provides for mandatory treble damages 
subject to a narrow exception that is not applicable to the 
case sub judice. See 31 U.S.C. S 3729(a) (providing a 
reduction from treble damages to double damages when a 
defendant supplies information concerning the violation 
prior to their knowledge of governmental investigation). As 
a result, creating an exception for local governments from 
the existing damages scheme would require us to rewrite 
the FCA. Of course, while Congress is free to do this if it 
chooses, such redrafting is outside the traditional province 
of the courts. Accord Garibaldi, 244 F.3d at 493. Therefore, 
we will not disturb the existing statutory damages 
provisions by reading into the Act an exception from treble 
damages for local governments. The result, in the end, is 
that a local government such as Delaware County cannot 
be subject to liability under the FCA in a qui tam action. 
 
IV. 
 
We conclude that the mandatory treble damages scheme 
imposed by the FCA is punitive and that local governments 
are exempt from FCA damages because Congress did not 
clearly express its intention under the Act to abrogate local 
governmental common law immunity against punitive 
damages. As a result, since the FCA does not, as written, 
permit a court to reduce treble damages awards, we 
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conclude that a local government cannot be subject to suit 
by a qui tam relator under the Act. For all these reasons, 
we will affirm the Order of the District Court dismissing 
Dunleavy's Second Amended Complaint. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                12 
 
